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Abstract 
Diaspora politics is of growing interest to International Relations (IR), yet theorizing about 
sending states’ engagement of diasporas in different global contexts has been minimal. Central 
to this article is the question: How do challenges to postconflict statehood shape a sending 
state’s diaspora engagement? I provide a fresh socio-spatial perspective on “diaspora 
positionality,” the power diaspora political agents amass or are perceived to amass from their 
linkages to different global contexts, which speaks to utilitarian, constructivist, and governance 
rationales, and to emerging IR relational and positional theories. This power is relative to that 
of other actors in a transnational social field, in which sending states and diasporas operate 
globally: it is socio-spatial, defined by social relationships among diasporas across the globe, and 
by their linkages to specific spatial contexts. I argue that postconflict states view the positional 
empowerment of diasporas in distant locations as an asset to their statebuilding. Diasporas are 
not controlled, but involved in extraterritorial processes through partially rationalized, partially 
implicit governance practices. The article focuses on Kosovo as a postconflict de facto state, and 
brings evidence from extensive multi-sited fieldwork in Kosovo in 2013, and the UK, US, 
Sweden, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in 2009-2017. 
 
Keywords: diaspora, international relations, contested sovereignty, socio-spatial, postconflict 
states 
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Introduction 
Diaspora politics is of growing interest to International Relations. A 2012 Forum in 
International Political Sociology offered a critical perspective on IR theory considering diasporas as 
unitary non-state actors in an international system, where nations and states are bound by the 
principle of state sovereignty (Ragazzi 2012:95). Contributors argued that “inside” and 
“outside” of the state are not clearly delineated between diasporas and sending states. Diasporas 
are “loosely organized and shifting networks of solidarity” (109), individuals, networks, and 
institutions (Koinova 2012:100) constructed as a category and governed at a distance (Kunz 
2012:104; Varadarajan 2012:98). Building on this discussion and this journal’s larger vision to 
feature plural perspectives on statehood in a critical conversation with mainstream IR theories, 
this article offers a novel positional approach about how sending states engage diasporas in 
global contexts, relating to broader issues of the art of government and state sovereignty.  
Central are the extraterritorial practices of postconflict sending states. Like other states, 
they experience contested sovereignty in an international system where territoriality and 
sovereignty are challenged and authority and legal jurisdictions overlap (Krasner 1999), 
fragmented into functionally defined arenas (Huysmans 2003:220), involving concrete socio-
temporal practices (Walker 1991), and enacted symbolically (Bartelson 2014:2). They also face 
their own sovereignty challenges, due to weak institutions, insufficient economic resources, 
internal ethnic and sectarian divisions, and disputed borders and international recognition. 
  How do challenges to postconflict statehood shape sending states’ diaspora engagement? 
I provide a fresh perspective on socio-spatial “diaspora positionality”: the power diaspora 
political agents amass or are perceived to amass from their position in linkages to other global 
contexts. This perspective provides complementary insights to IR utilitarian, constructivist, and 
governance rationales concerning sending states’ diaspora engagement, yet is clearly connected 
to a governance rationale considering diaspora engagement as involving a variety of practices. I 
argue that postconflict states are  likely to view  positional empowerment of diasporas in distant 
locations as an asset to their state-building. This consideration is partially rationalized and 
partially implicit. Empirically, the article focuses on Kosovo as a postconflict de facto state, with 
evidence from extensive fieldwork in Kosovo in 2013, and in the UK, US, Sweden, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands in 2009-2015.  
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Theorizing Sending States and Extraterritorial Diaspora Engagement 
The term “diaspora” is contested. Depending on “ontological politics” (Ragazzi 
2012:107), diasporas could be considered unitary actors (Collier and Hoeffler 2000) or multiple 
actors with identities not “given” but constructed by governments, diaspora entrepreneurs, and 
other agents (Sökefeld 2006; Ragazzi 2009; Kunz 2012). I use Adamson and Demetriou’s 
definition, emphasizing connectivities: “a social collectivity that exists across state borders and 
that has succeeded over time to: 1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity 
through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and 
2) address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed 
internal organizational framework and transnational links” (2007:497).. Diaspora entrepreneurs 
are individual and institutional agents who actively make claims on behalf of original 
homelands. Sending states are original homelands that maintain durable linkages with diasporas 
abroad, and incorporate diasporas into policy areas, such as health, labor, economy, culture, 
education, voting, and foreign policy (Collyer 2013; Gamlen 2014). De facto states designate 
polities with limited governance and proclaimed independence legally, and are non- or partially 
recognized by other states.  
Three major streams theorize about motivations of social agents to engage diasporas 
abroad: utilitarian, identity-based, and governance.1 In a utilitarian rationale, sending states 
engage diasporas as potential resources for material power (Gamlen 2014; Delano and Gamlen 
2014; Ragazzi 2009, 2014) and social capital (Brinkerhoff 2011a). Remittances constitute 13-
20% of the GDP of Armenia, Haiti, Moldova, and Nepal (World Bank 2010). Direct 
investment in small, medium, and large enterprises (Smart and Hsu 2004), diaspora bonds 
(Leblang 2010), philanthropic contributions (Sidel 2003; Brinkerhoff 2008), tourism (Coles 
and Timothy 2004), lobbying foreign governments (Shain and Barth 2003), and transfer of 
expertise (Lucas 2001) are very important. Sending states engage hometown associations to 
foster low-scale development (Brinkerhoff 2011a). They develop programs to attract returnees 
(Welch and Hao 2013), but may foster migrants to “achieve a secure status” in host-states for 
“sustained economic and political contributions” (Portes 1999). Sending states adopt multi-
tiered policies depending on migrants’ perceived utility abroad versus home (Tsourapas 2015), 
and thereby “tap into the diaspora” to “share the success” (Delano and Gamlen 2014).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To date, Gamlen 2008, Delano and Gamlen 2014, and Ragazzi 2014 have developed the most comprehensive 
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Utilitarian accounts capture important dimensions of diaspora politics, but are limited 
in several ways. Their theoretical emphasis is on cost-benefit calculations for material or social 
capital. Such premises, while often true, are not exclusive. Diasporas may be positioned in 
contexts offering other types of empowerment – symbolic, through geographic terrain, or 
concentration of networks and discourses – with other implications for engagement. 
Interactions between sending states and diasporas may not be clearly strategic. These accounts 
also do not discuss conflict or postconflict sending states.  
The identity-based (constructivist) rationale shows how sending states cultivate diaspora 
identities to maintain links with the original culture. A symbolic connection could be fostered 
through “transsovereign nationalism” (Csergo and Goldgeier 2004), reproducing the nation via 
co-nationals abroad without annexing territories. There are cosmopolitan principles, with 
multiple identities, citizenships, and residencies (Appiah 2006); narrower nationalist principles 
with citizenship restrictions (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001); or combinations (Bauboeck 
2005; Ragazzi 2014). The discussion mirrors classic civic versus ethnic nationalism debates 
(Varshney 2002), where sending states cultivate migrants by a civic principle, regardless whether 
they are majorities, or by a nationalist principle favoring one group over another. Sending states 
foster these links through commemorations of important holidays (Naujoks 2013); mother-
tongue education and nation-state curriculum (Kenway and Fahey 2011); teachers spreading 
national discourses (Tsourapas 2016); support for religious institutions (De Haas 2007); home 
country visits (Cohen 2008); and media and laws to benefit co-nationals (Waterbury 2010).  
This rationale speaks to IR constructivism, maintaining that ideas, values, and identities 
motivate agents in international politics. Sending states play an important role in awakening, 
constructing, reconstructing, and sustaining diaspora identities (Sökefeld 2006; Adamson and 
Demetriou 2007). As International Political Sociology readers are aware, this rendition of 
constructivism has been critiqued for its narrow sense considering identity construction. A 
definition of diaspora is itself a practice that produces a certain population (Ragazzi 2009). 
Sending states have recently “discovered” the “diaspora” as a category, re-labeling populations 
from expatriates (Kunz 2012), and problematic to valuable populations (Varadarajan 2012), or 
defining them nonterritorially (Busse 2015:75). Identity reproduction is pursued not 
strategically, but through activities tying ideas and materiality (Acuff 2012:13). Yet these  
accounts still do not consider how diasporas’ embeddedness in different contexts play a role in 
formatting and sustaining sending states’ identity-based extraterritorial practices.  
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The third, governance rationale features a variety of approaches. Sending states seek to 
govern diasporas through bilateral treaties (Valenta and Ramet 2012) or cooperation with 
international organizations (Gamlen et al. 2013). As readers of this journal are aware, diaspora 
governance can also be based on Foucault’s (1991) “governmentality,” where “multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge seek to 
shape conduct through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors” (Dean 
2010:18). Populations are not simply “subjects,” but individuals in a “set of processes which 
have to be managed naturally,” through reflection on how to influence and take advantage of 
them (Foucault 2004:72-74, quoted in Ragazzi 2009:10, see also Bigo 2002). Individuals are 
encouraged to participate in self-regulation, so boundaries between state and society are relative 
(Gordon 1991:36).  
Sending states shape but do not control diaspora conduct. They “(re)constitute 
diasporas through discursive and other practices, but also redefine governance techniques in 
times of neoliberal globalization” (Margheritis 2011:202). While governmentality does not 
necessarily entail governance through neoliberal means, neoliberalism defines such practices as 
dominating in the current global order (Ragazzi 2009).  Delano and Gamlen (2014) argue that 
neoliberal practices glorify markets, outsourcing state functions, a “light” managerial approach, 
self-reliance in a “web of rights and obligations” (Bhawati 2003), and expectations for diasporas 
to market the sending state through functions previously reserved for the state or other private 
actors (Larner 2007; Pellerin and Mullings 2013). Such technological and bureaucratic practices 
establish the basis for governance through consular offices assisting and controlling migrant 
populations and diaspora offices and ministries with extraterritorial remit (Gamlen et al. 2013), 
and providing services and advice for migrant rights and regularization of host-land status 
(Margheritis 2011). Such practices challenge a narrow conception of a Westphalian state, as 
they intervene in regulating populations’ affairs in other states, making diasporas integral to 
their own processes. Thus, “relations between authority, territory and populations are 
[differently] rationalized, organized, legitimized and practiced at the transnational and 
international levels” (Ragazzi 2009:383). No longer governed passively, diasporas  expect to be 
“active in their own government” (389).  
These approaches emphasize that sending states govern diasporas not simply through 
strategic calculations, but by engaging them in managerial processes. Sympathetic to this 
conversation, I take it further in a novel direction: how diasporas become empowered 
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positionally through embeddedness in different global contexts, and how such empowerment 
creates forms of rationalization or implicit consideration by sending states that foster long-
distance self-regulation.  
 
Diasporas and Postconflict Statehood  
I focus my inquiry on a postconflict state, where a socio-spatial positionality rationale 
becomes quite visible. In a political environment where a weak government seeks postconflict 
reconstruction, diaspora empowerment becomes important to governance. Postconflict states – 
such as Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosovo, and Macedonia 
– are reconstructing institutions, regimes, and economy, facing challenges to sovereignty not 
experienced by states with strong institutions and no recent violence. They are interested in 
state-building, a “particular approach to peace-building, premised on the recognition that 
achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the 
existence of capable, autonomous, and legitimate governmental institutions” (Paris and Sisk 
2009:1-2). International agents often intervene to handle domestic functions such as security, 
law, emergency relief, health care, and capital management (ibid.; Call 2008). Institutions may 
be rebuilt, but governments are often plagued by partisan politics, war networks, or local 
belligerents. Guerrilla groups may carve territories (Buhaug and Lujala 2005) and proclaim 
autonomy or de facto statehood. Attitudes of wartime elites may be carried into postconflict 
reconstruction, with sporadic violence, and expectations that diasporas provide resources for 
internal warfare, lobbying international governments, staging demonstrations, and influencing 
public opinion (Shain and Barth 2003; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Brinkerhoff 2011b; 
Koinova 2013). Postconflict state policies are almost by default pluralist and may be difficult to 
handle strategically.  
Connections between sending states and diasporas continue after displacement, with 
wartime legacies. Conflict-generated diasporas are often former refugees, who may want to 
return but have difficulty doing so, or whose towns are inhabited by formerly antagonistic 
groups. Linkages with diasporas can also entail connections through clandestine non-state 
actors or movements. When deep divisions are mirrored in multiple diasporas, the sending 
state has minimal capacity to formulate coherent policies toward them.  
Diasporas relate to postconflict states in multiple ways. They are powerful agents for 
economic reconstruction of homes, villages, and infrastructure, helping family members with 
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remittances. High-ranking personalities can return to take government positions (Brinkerhoff 
2008), such as World Bank employee Ellen Johnson Sirlief, elected president of Liberia in 
2005, and Ahmad Chalabi, who lobbied for US military intervention in Iraq and assumed high 
positions in postconflict Iraq. Executive and administrative participation in Somalia is high 
(Ismail 2011). Individuals can become high profile government advisors, as in Israel and 
Armenia; engage in forming new constitutions, and vote in referendums, as did Kurds for Iraq 
(Natali 2007); and aid establishment of truth commissions, as in Cambodia, Haiti, and Liberia 
(Young and Park 2009; Hoogenboom and Quinn 2011). 
Pearlman’s work on Lebanon (2013, 2014) is an exception in considering the agency of 
a weak postconflict sending state in diaspora outreach. She argues that weak states with 
multiple actors cannot claim “sovereign compulsory status of a state,” so “primary outreach to 
diasporas is unlikely to be the quest for ‘management’ and ‘control’ characteristic of sending 
state outreach, as much as complex webs of competition for advantage back home” (2014:36, 
2013). I build on this work and introduce a new analytical line of sociopositional rationale for 
diaspora engagement. 
 
Socio-spatial Diaspora Positionality in Transnational Social Fields  
I theorize here about a positional rationale for sending state diaspora engagement.2 This 
perspective adds value to IR scholarship, moving the analytical lens to consider interactions 
between sending states and diasporas embedded in a transnational social field with global 
contexts in relational terms. IR perspectives traditionally see the international system as 
constituted by state-to-state ties, following the influential work of Waltz (1979). More recently, 
they see networks of ties between social agents (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Nexon 
and Wright 2007). Nexon and Pouliot observe: “Relational theories, ranging from those using 
the methodology of social network analysis to post-structuralist modes of analysis, are recasting 
how we think about levels of analysis, actors, and the importance of social position” (2013:342). 
The pages of this journal discuss a variety of critical approaches related to the “practice turn” 
and relational perspectives, including Bourdieu’s relational vision of social fields (Bigo 2011; 
Leander 2011), securitization through communication (Cavelty and Jaeger 2015), postcolonial 
relations (Rojas 2016), relations to discursive formations (Widder 2008), and subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Here I develop an in-depth theoretical discussion building on earlier ideas in inception.  
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positioning enabling governmentality alongside Foucault (Bulley and Lisle 2012), among others. 
Socio-spatial diaspora positionality speaks to this cluster of relational and positional theories.  
Socio-spatial diaspora positionality is conceptualized as the power diaspora political 
agents perceive or are perceived to amass from socio-spatial position in a specific context and 
linkages to other global contexts. Diaspora positionality in a particular context is relative vis-à-vis 
other diasporas in a transnational social field, has a power dimension, and is fluid and 
perceptional. A socio-positional perspective informs utilitarian, constructivist, and governance 
rationales by showing that diasporas’ global position could be an asset for sending states. The 
governance rationale is nevertheless better suited to the socio-spatial positionality perspective: 
agents in sending states rationalize taking advantage of strengths diasporas acquire through 
contexts, but in fragmented ways. Some rationalize more explicitly; others embed visions more 
implicitly in narratives or act in line with what Jeffrey (2013) calls “improvising the state,” 
performing state-related practices in tailormade ways.  
 Both sending states and diasporas operate in what sociologists call a “transnational 
social field,” a “set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which 
ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed” (Bash et 
al. 1994; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004:1009). In Bourdieu’s classic understanding of a social 
field, repeated formal and informal interactions between individuals and institutions structure 
positions of power (1985). A “habitus,” a set of nonconscious dispositions and “embodied 
histories” (Bourdieu 1990:56), forms the basis from which agents relate to differently 
positioned others (Martin-Maze 2011:3), and defines the field’s boundaries. IR scholars take 
Bourdieu’s theory further to study international actors, somewhat autonomous (Bigo 2011; 
Leander 2011) or intersecting with national fields (Vauchez 2011:342). They warn that 
Bourdieu’s state-bound approach cannot be directly transposed to international politics, but 
importantly brings relational thinking (Guzzini 2013:89). Agents are not state or non-state 
actors defined by substances, but operate in a “totality of relations,” occupying specific 
positions, defined by implicit rules, and establishing hierarchies, dependencies, and 
contestation among elites and non-elites (Pouliot and Merand 2013:32-33).  
The socio-spatial perspective of diaspora positionality builds on but reimagines the 
Bourdieusian transnational social field and his relational approach focusing on practices. Such 
occur with a certain arbitrariness that does not reproduce “oppositions between reason and 
emotion and strategy as conscious and unconscious and spontaneous acts” (Bigo 2011:228). 
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The exact boundaries of transnational social fields are problematic to define, as diaspora 
identities and interactions change across time and space. These fields, characterized by social 
relationships, are nevertheless embedded in geographic territories defining some rules in the 
field, in transnational but also context-specific ways. Here my approach emphasizes the spatial 
dimension of interactions between agents in these fields. Diasporas have specific linkages to 
contexts – homelands, hostlands, and other locations – that shape how they might be 
empowered to contribute to a sending state. In such contexts, a fieldwide “habitus” could be 
existent but weak, as agents’ life experiences are defined by spatial specificities. In contrast to 
Bourdieusian understanding of position acquired by social interactions only, a socio-spatial 
approach sees position as reflecting the empowerment of diasporas through contextual 
embeddedness. Such positional empowerment becomes considered by sending states in both 
rationalized ways and subconscious dispositions.  
For example, an Albanian transnational social field, in which Kosovars operate 
alongside Albanians from Albania proper, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia as adjacent 
territories, is geographically spread primarily to Europe and North America. A field 
incorporating Kurdish territories in Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, Iran, and other neighboring 
territories in the Middle East is spread primarily to Europe and the Middle East. A Palestinian 
field is larger, as generations of Palestinians have migrated across the Middle East, Europe, the 
Americas, and to some degree Australia.  Agents positioned in Brussels, with numerous EU 
institutions, would be empowered differently from those in refugee camps, for example: 
sending states would likely consider Brussels-based diasporas well positioned to lobby for 
homeland goals.  
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The term positionality originates in feminist theory, considering knowledge production as 
situated in a particular context (Haraway 1988). Experiencing the world “in terms of gender, 
race, class, sexuality and other axes of social difference” entails different positionalities (Nagar 
and Geiger 2007). Feminists discuss identity-based positionalities; economic geographers 
consider positionality in spatial terms, as distant places are connected unevenly through global 
processes (Sheppard 2002:318-319). Spatial positionality is relative, because an agent’s position 
is always understood in terms of relationships; it involves power relations, since some positions 
are more influential than others; it is fluid, as it challenges configurations of relationships (318-
319); it is perceptional rather than objective (Koinova 2012). 	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Diaspora positionality needs to be understood as relative, since agents with strong links 
to a particular context might have specific value for other agents in the transnational social 
field. Certain contexts can provide “division of labor” and “comparative advantage” to pursue 
certain homeland-oriented goals (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:510; Lyons and Mandaville 
2010:132; Koinova 2012, 2013:18). Diasporas are embedded in specific contexts characterized 
by linkages to host-states, home-states, and other global locations, which empower them 
differently vis-à-vis other diasporas in the field. Sending states consider this empowerment an 
important nonmaterial dimension for their art of governance.  
Positionality also entails a power dimension (Sheppard 2002). Power in IR is a contested 
concept, minimally considered regarding diaspora politics. A “soft power” perspective, building 
on Nye (2004) and focusing on ability to attract and persuade without control or coercion, is 
considered relevant for diasporas and public diplomacy (Gonzales 2011; Tsourapas 2016). 
Power in diaspora socio-spatial positionality is nevertheless based less on exercise of agency than 
on agents’ embeddedness in context. It is different from Dahl’s actor-based definition: “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” 
(1957:202-203). Nor is it derived from control over resources or agenda-setting. Power in socio-
spatial positionality is close to what scholars call “power to” achieve certain goals, shaped by 
social – I add spatial – structures operating consciously or subconsciously, and providing agents’ 
“empowerment” (Lukes 1974/2005; Berenskoetter 2007; Rinkmar 2007). Power is not diffused 
and embodied in discourse, knowledge, and “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1991; Rabinow 1991), 
nor hegemonic, but context-specific. It can be actual or potential, exercised with only a certain 
degree of autonomy. It can be deployed to achieve peace, prosperity, democracy, and 
development (Ringmar 2007), all sending state goals of diaspora engagement. Power is 
relational, not in the Bourdieusian sense of hierarchically constructed social capital, but based 
on socio-spatial linkages of diasporas to global contexts that structure the ways they become 
empowered vis-à-vis other diasporas. Power in socio-spatial positionality is less conducive to 
what Guzzini calls “steering capacity” in global governance, characteristic for institutionalist and 
policy-oriented approaches, than to governance based on informal rule (2012:6) and pluralist 
practices. 
 Positionality is also fluid (Sheppard 2002), depending on changing reference contexts 
and linkages diaspora entrepreneurs maintain with each other and the sending state. Linkages 
can be assigned more or less relevance for a homeland-oriented goal, and become stronger or 
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weaker over time. For example, the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) changed the positional 
status of Armenians who had settled in Lebanon after the 1915 genocide (Auron 2003). During 
and after the civil war, Armenians migrated en masse to the US, France, and other European 
countries. Lebanon and its positionality remained important in the Armenian transnational 
social field, but no longer a center for diaspora cultural activities, which shifted to the US and 
France. 
Positionality is perceptional. Diaspora entrepreneurs may have  identities, human capital, 
homeland linkages, or goals that shape their perceptions of power. Embedded in context, they 
view themselves or are viewed as able to pursue homeland-oriented goals in line with what Sen 
calls “positional objectivity”: people in the same position are more likely to make the same 
observations or judgments (1993:126-45). Agents within sending states may have different 
perspectives and goals regarding the diaspora. But they voice perceptions and develop practices 
from the position of the sending state.  
The perceptional property of positionality is clearly visible when juxtaposed to an 
objective “position” in a social network, where a position of power exists when a node 
commands high “centrality” or thick interconnectedness with other parts of the network 
(Bonachich 1991). Objective properties are measured by ties, node centrality, and structural 
equivalence, among others (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). Socio-spatial positionality 
has perceptions of sending states and diaspora entrepreneurs about how power is contextually 
embedded. 
A positionality perspective becomes quite visible in relationships between sending states 
experiencing contested sovereignty in postconflict states and diasporas abroad. With limited 
staff and resources, and often materially impoverished diasporas, such states are likely to 
consider alternative ways diasporas become empowered abroad, including positionality in 
different contexts, as discussed shortly.  
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
Kosovo was selected from a universe of postconflict cases of de facto states: Palestine, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhasia, South Ossetia, and Somaliland, among others. In the face of 
sporadic violence, such polities seek legitimization of statehood. Diasporas are often important, 
as they can provide support when other agents are constrained by international restrictions. By 
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2017, Kosovo had received 115 diplomatic recognitions, though is not yet fully recognized as a 
state. 
The comparative perspective is crucial, as I focus on Kosovo’s engagement with the 
diaspora in 2008-2013 in US, UK, Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland. The methodology 
cannot be confined to conventions about case study research through immersion in a single 
case (George and Bennett 2004), or comparative research based on small-N cases (Lijphart 
1971). Both approaches, valid when studying phenomena within and between states, are 
problematic when studying relationships between agents on the international systemic level. They 
exemplify the pitfalls of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Shiller 2002; 
Adamson 2016), not suited to global relational dynamics. Here comparisons of host states are 
used to illustrate – rather than causally trace – variations in how sending states perceive and 
engage diaspora empowerment in different contexts.  
I gathered data through multi-sited research, informed by 60 semi-structured interviews in 
2013-2017 among policy makers from governmental, nongovernmental, and international 
organizations, party representatives, diaspora returnees, and representatives of Kosovo Albanian 
diasporas in the UK, Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland. Primary research through semi-
structured interviews is especially important to capture perceptions, crucial to understanding 
the positionality perspective. The interviews were conducted in Albanian, English, Swedish, and 
German. I also used secondary sources to illustrate arguments related to Switzerland and the 
US.  
I analyze the sending states’ extraterritorial politics toward the Kosovo Albanian 
diasporas in the US, UK, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Estimated at 113,661 people (US 
Census 2000), the US-based diaspora has been dominated by descendants of anticommunist 
migrants who left Albania after World War II and settled primarily in New York, Chicago, and 
Washington, DC (Hockenos 2003). UK-based immigration is more recent, associated with 
refugees and those who fled Albania after the Cold War, estimated at 70,000-100,000, and well 
organized in London (ibid.). The diasporas in Switzerland (around 340,000) and Germany 
(around 550,000) originated in “guest worker” emigration from former Yugoslavia in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Albanian Diaspora 2010), constituted primarily of Albanians from Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Switzerland and Germany host almost 60% of migrants from Kosovo (World Bank 
2011), concentrated in Zurich, Lucerne, and Bern, and respectively in Berlin, Stuttgart, 
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Frankfurt, and Munich. The Sweden-based diaspora, primarily from Kosovo in the early 1990s, 
is concentrated in Malmö and Gothenburg. 
 
Postconflict State-building in Kosovo and the Role of the Diaspora  
The Kosovo Albanian diaspora has been highly important for the evolution of Kosovo 
from an autonomous region in Serbia in 1989 to a de facto state in 2008. Immediately after the 
Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic curtailed Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, Kosovo Albanians 
emigrated en masse to the US and Western Europe. In 1991, a nonviolent movement under the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) developed parallel institutions to maintain the livelihood 
of segregated Kosovo Albanians (Hockenos 2003). In 1998-1999, warfare between Kosovo 
Albanians and the Serbian regime culminated in ethnic cleansing and large-scale forced 
migration. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as a radical movement from diaspora 
circles, and developed subversive activities in Kosovo and northern Albania (ibid). A galvanized 
diaspora provided wartime funds, lobbying, and fighters (Perritt 2008), and helped draw NATO 
into its 1999 military campaign. Between UNMIK’s arrival in Kosovo (2000) and Kosovo’s 
independence (2008), the UN, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
and EU assumed major state-building functions in Kosovo refugee return, developing and 
monitoring political processes and economic reconstruction (Skendaj 2014). Exhausted 
diaspora members considered state-building primarily for new institutions (Koinova 2013).  
Interest in diaspora-related institutions surged after independence. The de facto state 
began seeking international legitimacy and self-sufficiency. Three years later, in 2011, a Ministry 
of Diaspora was developed from the Agency for Diaspora in the Office of the Prime Minister. 
In 2009-2012 the government adopted a National Strategy on Migration, primarily concerned 
with irregular migration and administration of legal migration (World Bank 2011). Its portfolio 
expanded in 2013. With support from IOM, Finland, and UNDP, intense consultation took 
place among more than 900 Kosovar diaspora members in thirteen countries, mostly Europe 
and the US (Cancel 2013). A Diaspora Strategy (2013) formed with strands for financial 
investment, education and curriculum initiatives, and public diplomacy.  
The next three sections present empirical evidence speaking to utilitarian, constructivist, 
and governance rationales, and demonstrating that a socio-spatial positionality rationale was 
implemented in governance processes through a combination of partially rationalized and 
partially subconscious practices.  
Koinova, Maria “Sending States and Diaspora Positionality in IR”  
International Political Sociology, forthcoming in 2018. 	  
15 
	  
 
Figure 2: Kosovo and Diasporas in the Albanian Transnational Social Field 
 
 
 
Diaspora Financial Investments 
Speaking to a utilitarian rationale, Kosovo officials sought to govern the diaspora for 
material power through financial investment, using practices not necessarily in the Diaspora 
Strategy. Individual remittances have been the largest source of external financing, given that 
one of four Kosovo households has at least one member living abroad (World Bank 2010); 25% 
receive around €600 million per year (Diaspora Strategy 2013). Direct financial investment is 
also important, although numerous interviewees found it still minimal. Exact data are difficult 
to obtain, since Kosovo’s Statistical Office does not gather information on whether Foreign 
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Direct Investment (FDI) stems from diaspora sources (R1 2013). The Ministry of Diaspora has 
identified about 500 diaspora entrepreneurs interested in investing in small factories, mostly 
construction or primary agricultural production, with sporadic interest from large 
entrepreneurs in the energy sector (R2 2013). While affluent individual business entrepreneurs 
have emerged in various parts of the transnational social field, the majority has not been 
affluent. The average diaspora salary is €1,700 in resident countries: around 33% in 
construction, 11% in restaurants and hotels, 11% in manufacturing, agriculture, and other 
services, with only 7% in managerial positions (Riinvest 2007).  
As diaspora affluence per se is not decisive for sending state engagement, one might 
consider that sending states are motivated by diaspora size to engage in some contexts compared 
to others. I argue that size is indeed important, as larger groups are better organized and easier 
to solicit than individuals. Yet size does not directly translate into financial investment. For 
example, the diaspora in Switzerland is smaller than that in Germany, but in 2013 when I 
conducted my fieldwork, the strongest visible investment was from Switzerland. Bexhdet Pacoli, 
CEO of a Swiss-based construction and engineering company, built the 5-star Swiss Diamond 
Hotel in Pristina. The entertainment complex Vali Ranch near Gjilan was built by the owner of 
another Swiss construction business. The “ethno-village” near Pristina, where Albanian culture 
is celebrated with music and theater, was built by Valdet Avdiu, also from Switzerland. Kosovo 
officials consider the diaspora in Switzerland easier to govern than that in Germany, since it is 
highly concentrated in a small state, where ties among members are strong and sending state 
activities can be more effective (R3 2017). 
I argue that a socio-spatial positionality rationale exists beyond utilitarian logic regarding 
diasporas’ financial investments. Sending state and diasporas operate in a transnational social 
field, and specific positions in that field empower diasporas in two ways toward Kosovo’s 
financial investment: the power diaspora entrepreneurs amass from the context in which they 
are embedded and the specific linkages they maintain with elites in the sending state. Regarding 
financial investment, the diaspora in Switzerland, Germany, and the US has been considered 
much more important in positional terms than those in Sweden or the UK. Such 
considerations have not been mentioned explicitly in the Diaspora Strategy, emerging in 
partially rationalized, partially subconscious ways.  
Switzerland has been considered an empowering context, since it has a large diaspora 
but pays serious attention to diaspora engagement in economic development. In 2011 a 
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bilateral agreement was signed for investment protection (Johnson and Sachs 2014). The Swiss 
government is interested in measures to integrate migrants returning from Switzerland (R5 
2013); it sponsored an NGO initiative, Diasporas for Development, to work on investment 
strategies. In contrast, sources close to the German government mentioned that diaspora 
investment in Kosovo is important for Germany, and several entrepreneurs have already made 
investments, but the biggest concern is to engage stakeholders to thwart Kosovo’s illegal 
migration (R7, R8 2013). This statement was made as Germany was experiencing a large wave 
of Kosovars seeking refugee status. From the diaspora view, Germany’s context has nevertheless 
been conducive to financial investment because it fosters “rewarding of members for hard 
work” (R9 2015). 
Similar arguments about empowerment through context can be made regarding the US-
based diaspora. US government programs and initiatives have supported Kosovo’s business and 
entrepreneurship (US Embassy 2010). The context is also perceived as important for financial 
investment, because it fosters individual entrepreneurship in a political culture of individualism 
and low taxation, and has attracted Albanian migrants who seek entrepreneurial opportunities 
and competition in market terms. Compared to some European countries, the US is 
considered as offering opportunities for quick upward mobility and accumulation of capital, 
even to the first migration generation, still emotionally connected to their homeland and 
inclined to invest in it. This perception is important, as recent research shows a more 
complicated view. Upward mobility in the US has stagnated in past decades (NCPA 2014), but 
perceptions in Kosovo, crucial for positional thinking, have not, as numerous respondents 
mention.  
There is a contrast in how Sweden and the UK are engaged. Sweden with its high 
taxation welfare state is considered as not fostering the same degree of entrepreneurship; thus 
financial investment in Kosovo has been minimal (R10, R11 2013). The majority work in 
highly taxed jobs or receive social benefits, with little room for accumulation of capital. More 
attention to Kosovo’s economic development has been paid only more recently, regarding 
Sweden (R12 2014) and the UK. Since the diasporas in both countries emerged from refugees 
of the early 1990s, and Kosovo Albanians in the UK are not yet a major part of London-based 
financial institutions, sending state elites have considered their positional power to contribute 
to Kosovo in domains other than financial investment.  
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The second way sending states consider diaspora positionality is by evaluating the 
transnational linkages to diasporas in specific contexts. Short distances and concentration of 
Kosovo Albanians in several Swiss cities, for example, have facilitated thick connections to the 
homeland through circular migration (R2 2013). The nature of ties is also important, with 
implications beyond physical proximity. Thick linkages between investors and prominent 
returnees and local politicians are often built on political credentials from pursuing 
independence. Endorsement of investment opportunities from former Prime Minister Hashim 
Thaci was considered important. Thaci spent much of his life in Switzerland, where he 
organized the KLA that battled the Serbian regime in 1998-1999, and a hub for radical diaspora 
activities developed. Behgjet Pacolli, who lobbied for Kosovo independence, is leader of the 
New Kosovo Alliance party and former First Deputy Prime Minister. Harry Bajraktari, a 
member of the National Albanian-American Council, a US-based organization that actively 
lobbied for independence, launched one of the biggest investment schemes in Kosovo after 
1999. Even before independence, Dino Assanaj, a major US-based KLA activist, became chair 
of the Privatization Agency, and built an “International Village” of expensive homes for 
diaspora and other international persons near Pristina (Koinova 2013). Florin Krasniqi, a New 
York roofing company owner who organized a major fund-raising campaign to aid the KLA 
during the 1998-1999 warfare, became an MP from the opposition party Vetevendosje, with 
ambitions to invest in a small power plant in the Decani region during privatization (Winne 
2010). Another entrepreneur, with ties to an American-Canadian company, aims to build a 
power plant in the Dukadjini region to process coal from substantial reserves (R9 2013).  
Positionality considerations regarding financial investment become highly visible in a 
postconflict de facto, cash-strapped state such as Kosovo, whose position in a transnational social 
field provides another layer of politics. It needs to target the best diaspora resources available 
and encourage diasporas to contribute as much as possible. A postconflict de facto state must deal 
with other obstacles to diaspora investment too. Solutions available to internationally 
recognized states – government matching funds for investments, or diaspora banks to lower 
wire transfer barriers and give loans – have not yet materialized. There is consensus among 
potential entrepreneurs, members of international organizations, and even government officials 
that corruption and problems with rule of law prevent diaspora members from financial 
investment. Property and technology must be guaranteed and potential legal disputes handled 
through still dysfunctional courts. It is not surprising that wartime credentials of diaspora 
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entrepreneurs and local politicians have provided a certain degree of self-regulation concerning 
Kosovo’s extraterritorial financial investments. 
 
Maintaining Identity through Educational Initiatives  
Speaking to an identity-based rationale, the Kosovo Diaspora Strategy developed a second 
pillar about preservation of cultural identity and language, using educational initiatives as 
governance practices to maintain the diaspora. The document mentions that 20,000 diaspora 
children abroad benefit from Albanian language education, with around 400 teachers in after-
school programs. Some teachers worked voluntarily during the 1990s and 2000s, and the 
“home-state needs to compensate them financially” (R4 2013).  
Diaspora positionality is also considered during extraterritorial engagement with 
identity-based politics, even if references to diasporas’ global positions are not mentioned 
directly in the Diaspora Strategy. In practice, Kosovo institutions seek expertise from 
environments already conducive to Albanian education abroad, such as Sweden. Adamson and 
Demetriou (2007) make a similar argument about Sweden and Kurdish diaspora education. 
Kosovo’s officials rationalize some of their practices; they see education in Sweden as good and 
largely free, compared to other industrialized states, where fees have skyrocketed. Numerous 
diaspora members in Helsingborg, Gothenburg, and Malmö have taught the language to 
Kosovo Albanian pupils as a mother tongue in the Swedish educational system, acquiring 
expertise that could be governed long-distance to favor Kosovo’s state-building. A key diaspora 
entrepreneur, an advisor to the Diaspora Ministry, argues that demand for educational 
materials in Albanian originated from Switzerland and other countries (R11 2013). Yet 
diaspora members from Sweden have shaped such policies, and are also sought to take part in 
educational exchanges with Kosovo and Albania as a kin-state, and to participate in media and 
publication programs (R13 2014; focus group 2014).  
Advancing a diaspora positionality perspective is different from arguing that the de facto 
state sought to engage the most highly educated diaspora. In fact, most wealthy, educated 
migrants left Pristina in the 1990s and settled in the UK. The diaspora in Sweden originated in 
emigration of blue-collar workers in the Trepca mines in Northern Kosovo, who were dismissed 
in the early 1990s by the Serbian regime and fled to Sweden with their large families (R11 
2013). They took advantage of free education, quickly learning to teach Albanian in a Western 
context. Mother-tongue education in Sweden is developed by the state, with no leeway for 
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diaspora entrepreneurs to change the curriculum. The Swedish context, not initial background, 
empowered diaspora entrepreneurs to engage in Albanian-language educational affairs.  
 A major endeavor of Kosovo as a sending state has been to develop an Albanian-
language curriculum for diaspora children with origins in Albania proper and other territories 
in the Balkans as part of the transnational social field. Sending state officials together with 
diaspora members developed the curriculum to consider national identity, while Kosovo’s 
contested sovereignty created a dilemma on how to practice this identity (R14 2013). An 
interviewee argued:  
The Ministry of Education titled this initiative “The Curriculum for Albanian Schools in 
Diaspora.”… Then immediately the question emerged as to which national identity are we 
trying to develop? Others said, of course, Albanian. Why Albanian, we are Kosovo? OK, 
the majority of our people are Albanian. Then came up the issue: isn’t it then the task of 
Albania, which is the mother country, to develop such curriculum and to maintain and 
develop Albanian schools in the diaspora? And why we, a small Kosovo with our 
problems, try to do their task? So the answer was, we want to start the initiative, they have 
not thought about this, and they do not have such a strong diaspora in European 
countries as we do, where the educational system allows for the schooling in native 
languages. OK. We need to cooperate with Albania. But then the Serb citizens of Kosovo 
in the diaspora, which curriculum are they going to follow? Of course, they will go to the 
Serbian state, because their diaspora belongs to Serbia. (R14 2013)  
This discussion indicates wider challenges to a postconflict state, reflecting debates about 
ethnonational versus civic diaspora engagement. The Diaspora Strategy explicitly mentions “any 
person dwelling or emplaced outside Kosovo who was born or has family origins in the 
Republic of Kosovo,” based on a 2010 Diaspora law. It implies sending state engagement with 
ethnonational diversity of concerned populations, including Kosovo Albanians, Serbs, Turks, 
and Roma, among others. Even if aspiring to be rooted in a civic principle, the strategy 
mentions that a “definition of a diaspora member is a theoretical challenge, taking into account 
the difficulties to define this community itself,” and refers extensively to the Albanian 
community and cooperation with Albania. A representative of an international organization 
argued that actual diaspora engagement practices take place primarily on an ethnonational 
principle (R15 2013). A leader of a Serbian institution in Gracanica near Pristina argued that 
engaging state institutions in Pristina has nothing to do with local Serbs (R16 2013). Although 
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a strategic document formulated diaspora identity in both civic and ethnonational terms, actual 
sending state practices engaged diaspora identity primarily through the ethnonational version. 
This speaks to Ragazzi (2009) and Kunz (2012), seeing sending state practices as defining a how 
diasporas are categorized. 
 
Public Diplomacy for Promotion of State Identity 
The third major way Kosovo engages its diaspora is via governance of public diplomacy. 
The Diaspora Strategy notes a need for “promotion of state identity,” characteristic for a de facto 
postconflict state, which needs its diaspora not simply to lobby a host-state’s foreign policy, but 
to shape the state’s international image and aid endorsement of sovereignty. Broader diaspora 
engagement in public diplomacy takes place not simply via ethnic lobbies in foreign policy 
making, but via a “light-touch” managerial and nation-branding approach characteristic of a 
governance rationale. Browning argues that nation-branding entails a brand aimed at enhancing 
competitiveness in a neoliberal world order. The goal is to communicate values and identity 
narratives to both external actors of the state and citizens at home and abroad, and to police the 
“content of the conduct” (2015:195-221). Whether directly engaged or not in lobby 
organizations, larger diaspora and especially personalities with high visibility – musicians, 
actors, sport stars, and others – are sought to communicate such values broadly and 
internationally.  
Kosovo as a small postconflict de facto state has limited capacity to reach out to the 
world. It is burdened by lack of full diplomatic recognition and a negative image from 1990s 
warfare (Xharra and Waehlisch 2012). Public diplomacy is particularly important for polities 
that need to turn an image of a wartorn society into one with greater potential (2011). Months 
after proclamation of independence in 2008, the Israeli company Saatchi and Saatchi won a 
Kosovo government tender to launch an advertising campaign, “Kosovo – The Young 
Europeans,” capitalizing on the fact that Kosovo has the youngest population of Europe 
(average age 25). Eventually criticized for overspending and lack of ethnic and age-based 
diversity, the campaign nevertheless put on the map the importance of “people power” and 
individuals in furthering independence. The potential diaspora role was further highlighted by 
the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Waehlisch and Xharra 2011), discussing ways to 
engage the diaspora, including suggestions for policies from Armenia, Israel, and Serbia. The 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with opening a position of Deputy Foreign Minister to 
engage the diaspora. 
A government-based respondent said it was decided to diversify the traditional foreign 
policy portfolio to change Kosovo’s image. “Tectonic shifts” since independence – “one of the 
most progressive constitutions in Europe with legal embeddedness of LGTB and other rights” – 
have gone unnoticed: the image still reflects events and tensions in the divided city of 
Mitrovica. Individuals in Kosovo and the diaspora can spread a better image through social 
networks. Pop-star Rita Ora from Britain raised the Kosovo flag in a clip viewed by thousands. 
Football player Xherdan Shaqiri, a second-generation Kosovar who plays for Bayern Munich, 
wore the Kosovo flag during a game (R17 2013). Important figures come from sports (mostly 
Europe), and performance (mostly US) sectors (Xharra and Waehlisch 2011).  Engaging the 
first Kosovo MP in Sweden has also been important (ibid.).  
At first glance, public diplomacy seems to target high visibility personalities regardless of 
context, so diaspora positionality might not matter. I argue that diasporas in countries 
associated with Kosovo’s international recognition are more targeted than others. They are 
perceived as having more “power to” engage in diplomatic processes, as the host-state is engaged 
in other state-recognition activities. The first transnational meetings on public diplomacy took 
place in the US, the traditional context to lobby for Kosovo’s independence before NATO’s 
1999 intervention and aftermath (Koinova 2013). After 2008’s proclaimed independence, 
power in diplomacy shifted, as EU states – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain – 
refrained from recognizing Kosovo as an independent state. The UK has been considered to 
have more diplomatic leverage in EU-based foreign policy than the US, considering Kosovo a 
subject of EU foreign and enlargement policy.  
Demonstrating how positionality could be fluid over time, relationships with the UK-
based diaspora developed in more depth. Selimi (2011) argues that this relationship is a classic 
example of how history and sentiment count in such engagement. The UK, not the largest 
investor in Kosovo, or hosting a large Kosovo Albanian diaspora,is viewed as the country to aid 
Kosovo through diplomatic channels. In June 2011, Kosovo’s Foreign Ministry, UK Embassy, 
and British Council in Kosovo signed a memorandum, “Communication with Europe through 
Diplomacy” (KNCEI 2016), which Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj called part of “our strategy 
to successfully conclude the processes of recognition,” by “strengthening institutional 
communication with European states which have still not recognized Kosovo.” It aims to 
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involve advocacy, public personalities, civil society, intellectuals (MFA 2011), and alleged public 
diplomacy with a political foundation (R17 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
Academic discussion of why and how sending states engage diasporas has so far regarded 
motivations in utilitarian, identity-based (constructivist), and governance rationales. I advance a 
complementary socio-spatial rationale of diaspora positionality, putting at the analytical forefront 
diaspora embeddedness in home-states, host-states, and other locations in a larger transnational 
social field, defined by social interactions among sending states and diaspora agents, embedded 
in specific spatial locations. Diaspora positionality is relative, based not on absolute categories 
but on relationships among diasporas in different contexts and sending state(s); it has a power 
dimension viewed as empowerment to potentially achieve certain homeland-oriented goals, is 
fluid over time, and is perceptional..  
Empirical evidence from rich multi-sited fieldwork has shown how the socio-positional 
rationale permeates utilitarian, identity-based, governance rationales, as sending states could 
consider how diasporas’ embeddedness in contexts empowers them to enhance material and 
social capital, construct or foster national or cosmopolitan identities, or participate as self-
sustained agencies in transnational governance. Kosovo authorities seek the diasporas in the 
US, Switzerland, and Germany for financial investments, Sweden for educational matters, and 
the UK and US for public diplomacy and branding coined by the sending state. The socio-
spatial perspective is nevertheless best accommodated by theories of governance, as diaspora 
engagement takes place through partially rationalized, partially implicitly driven practices, 
performed by multiple agents beyond sending state authorities. A postconflict state could have 
an official strategy but little capacity to manage extraterritorial processes, adopting a “catch-all” 
approach reflecting or deviating from official strategy and considering diasporas agents of 
governance through self-regulation. The multiple actors in diaspora engagement, whether 
agents of sending states or diaspora entrepreneurs, understand that contextual empowerment 
could be an asset to a cash-strapped polity. 
This article has also discussed how sovereignty is contested and reflected in the 
governance of diaspora politics in a postconflict state. Such state is plagued by limited 
institutional capacity and brain-drain due to warfare or underdevelopment. This prompts its 
elites to engage the diaspora by including them in extraterritorial social practices rather than 
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through full-scale management. First, a positional perspective becomes highly visible, since there 
is no affluent or well-networked diaspora to engage, and sending state elites need to achieve 
most with minimal effort. They consider diaspora positionality a nontangible resource, 
empowering diasporas through context. Second, postconflict states are also plagued by linkages 
between diaspora entrepreneurs and sending state authorities with war legacies. Credentials of a 
diaspora member from previous fighting for Kosovo’s independence are often translated into 
self-initiative and opportunities for financial investment. Such linkages are not simply thick or 
thin as global interactions, but carry specific substance, here wartime loyalties turned into 
postwar legacies. Such linkages, as well as local corruption, could prevent other diaspora 
members from participating in sending state processes. Third, a postconflict state may not 
necessarily engage the diaspora through a civic national identity. Evidence from Kosovo’s 
educational curriculum development demonstrates that international pressure to include civic 
principles for diaspora engagement may be strategically defined but not implemented, or be 
complemented by practices reifying an ethnonational identity. Finally, especially a de facto state 
such as Kosovo may systematically seek diasporas to legitimize statehood and policies through 
public diplomacy. Even with little institutional capacity, public diplomacy aiming at state 
recognition might be fostered with more vigor than by internationally recognized states.  
Discussion of Kosovo’s sending state engagement with diasporas is an instance of a 
larger phenomenon, to be expanded upon with empirical evidence from other transnational 
social fields with different global spread, boundaries, and internal dynamics. Further empirical 
research with Armenian, Kurdish, Palestinian, and other transnational social fields could shed 
light on how sending states, de facto states, or areas of limited governance engage conflict-
generated diasporas in global contexts. This perspective challenges a simplistic understanding of 
sovereignty as internal and external, and a model of relationships between diasporas, host-states, 
and home-states, since diasporas may be linked to more than one sending or host-state. Kosovo 
sending state agents included Albanians in Albania and other Balkan countries in their 
considerations. Armenians might be considered not only by Armenia proper, but by Nagorno-
Karabakh as a de facto state, and Turkey and Lebanon with Armenian populations. Kurds in 
Europe have linkages to the Middle East, including Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, and Iran. 
Palestinians are linked to West Bank and Gaza, Jerusalem, refugee camps, and other Middle 
East territories. In these fields, sending states are weak states, plagued by conflict and attempts 
at postconflict reconstruction.  
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The ramifications of a socio-spatial diaspora positionality rationale go beyond linkages 
between diasporas and polities experiencing contested sovereignty. A transnational social field 
perspective on IR expands thinking beyond states, while focusing on states, their levels of 
sovereignty contestation, and diasporas belonging to a particular field. Contextual 
empowerment of diasporas could take place vis-à-vis other diasporas in that field, but the 
relations between different agents are context-specific and field-specific, not state-specific. A 
stronger state with more capacity than a weak one would still be part of assorted relationships 
with diasporas, durable or ad hoc, cooperative or conflictual, or based on specific content. Both 
contexts in which diasporas are embedded and substance and frequency of linkages between 
them and sending states shape the art of diaspora governance.  
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